![]() ![]() In addition, our analysis identifies two ways in which formal institutions have impacted factional politics. Also, among three measurements of workplace-based factional ties, the most restrictive definition seems to generate the least measurement errors and the most consistent predictions. These errors will bias the estimates downward and increase the standard errors in most cases. An overly broad definition of factional ties, however, likely will produce more measurement errors than more restrictive definitions of factions. Our findings suggest that different secretary generals likely had slightly varying styles of forming factions, which cautions analysts against perceiving factions as being based on a particular type of ties. Hu Jintao, in contrast, recruited faction members primarily from among previous work colleagues, especially from the early stage of his career. Our results show Hu Yaobang, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping recruited faction members who shared native place, school, and work ties with them. ![]() We then evaluate which measure of faction predicted the promotion of clients in various factions to full Central Committee membership during party congresses where the patron was either the incumbent or the out-going incumbent party secretary general. We first derive four reasonable ways of measuring factional ties. Guided by the qualitative literature on faction, we seek to examine how reform era leaders in China have formed their factions. As Pye put it long ago, factions are “… personal relationships of individuals who, operating in a hierarchical context, create linkage networks that extend upward in support of particular leaders who are, in turn, looking for followers to ensure their power” (Pye Reference Pye1981, 7). Faction is defined here as a set of mutually beneficial ties between multiple clients and a patron which aim at maximizing the patron's power. However, it remains a matter of anecdotal observation how various leaders in the party have recruited their factions. Recent purges in the Chinese political elite provide strong evidence that factional affiliations continue to be a central organizing principle in the largest authoritarian regime in the world. At the same time, strict retirement rules on lower level officials gave rise to a cohort effect that gave the general secretary greater influence over the promotion of alternate Central Committee members to the full Central Committee during their first term than in subsequent terms. We further uncover signs that the party institutions may allow deposed secretary generals some measure of influence over promotions even after their political demise. Our results show that Hu Yaobang, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping pursued broadly based factional recruitment strategies, while Hu Jintao recruited faction members mainly from work colleagues. We then explore the factional recruitment strategy pursued by each reform-era (1978–present) party secretary generals of the CCP by evaluating the measures of factional ties which predicted their clients’ promotions to full Central Committee membership. To investigate this, we first derive four reasonable ways of measuring factional ties as suggested by the literature. Although this trend may be true in general, senior leaders may still recruit those with whom they share birth place and school ties into their factions. Some scholars argue reasonably that with increasing specialization of officials, factions are increasingly dominated by those with shared work experience in a set of bureaucracies. The literature on faction suggests that patrons in the party may recruit faction members on the basis of a broad range of shared traits and experience.
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